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The European Tendency Toward Non-Extradition to the United
States in Capital Cases: Trends, Assurances, and Breaches of Duty
Robert Gregg*
I. Introduction
In the wake of cases such as Soering v. United Kingdom, In Re
Venezia, and the United States' pending request of France for the
extradition of James Kopp, the topic of European nations' treaty
obligations to extradite to the U.S. in capital cases has become
increasingly contentious and problematic. Further, the United States'
recent ouster from the United Nations Human Rights Committee, quite
possibly resulting from its staunch refusal to join the ranks of abolitionist
European and other nations, justifies some degree of speculation that the
European Union and its member states may be employing their judicial
power, international influence, and human rights rhetoric in an improper
effort to coerce the U.S. to abandon its practice of capital punishment.!
At the very least, these nations are neglecting their treaty obligations to
the U.S., (thereby violating the most fundamental tenets of international
law and damaging their international reputations), and may also be
unduly interfering with U.S. domestic, criminal justice matters.
This note will look briefly at how and under what circumstances
the death penalty is used within the U.S., consider its place in modem
criminal justice, its role and status in international law, and the
developing trend in Europe to refuse U.S. extradition requests because of
this country's continued use of capital punishment.
II. Capital Punishment in the United States
It is worth pointing out that the United States has struggled with
the issue of the appropriate use of the death penalty. It has not, as a
nation, and as some have suggested, unthinkingly accepted it as part of
its cultural heritage.2 The United States Constitution clearly provides for
the death penalty under the 5"', 8t', and 14d' Amendments. The U.S.
Supreme Court has so interpreted these Amendments, while imposing
substantial limitations on use of the penalty, primarily in the areas of
* (J.D.) magna cum laude, University of Miami School of Law, 2002. I would
like to thank my wife Andrea and daughter Elise for their love and support. I
would also like to thank Professors Abraham and Williamson, as well as all of
the members of the UM Leipzig team.
'Editor's Note: The United States has since been readmitted to the UN Human
Rights Committee.
2See Hugo A. Bedau, International Human Rights Law and the Death Penalty in
America, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997).
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proportionality to the crime and systematic fairness of application3 .
Twelve states have chosen to abolish capital punishment, while a
significant majority have either retained or reinstated its use after a
prohibitionist period.4 (Kansas reinstated the death penalty in 1994, and
New York did so in 1995.)5 This corresponds to the overall popular
support the death penalty has with U.S. citizens generally. According to
the most recent Gallup poll, support for the death penalty in the U.S. is at
67%, and has not fallen below 65% since 1980.6 Included in this number
is the support of a majority of African Americans, 7 towards whom
abolitionists frequently claim the American criminal justice system is
most biased and unfair.8 While there are many factors to consider in
determining whether the death penalty is or is not applied equally
without regard to race or any other prohibited basis (e.g., percentage of
the overall population, race of victims), on this point it is significant to
note that more whites by far are sentenced to and receive the ultimate
punishment than minorities.9 This does not prove that U.S. capital
punishment processes (or the criminal justice or any other system) are
foolproof, or even that they are not racist. It does, however, strongly
suggest that there do not appear, to most Americans including African
Americans, to be significant problems with procedural safeguards for the
accused in potentially capital cases.
In 1972, after finding that the death penalty as then implemented
was unconstitutional as violative of the 8th and l4e" Amendments, the
Court effectively struck down all existing state death penalty laws. 0 The
Court subsequently (beginning in 1976) upheld the constitutionality of
3See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
4 Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, at
http://www.web.amnesty.org.
5 Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, Note, The United States-"Capital" of the World:
An Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While the
International Trend is Towards its Abolition, 24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 855
1999).
Gallup Org., at http://www.gallup.com.
7 Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes:
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19, 31.
8 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report Killing with
Prejudice: Race and the Death Penalty in the USA, May 1999, at
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/rightsforaU/dp/race/index.html).
9 The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics website at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cp.htm reports that since the reinstatement of the
death penalty in 1976 by the Supreme Court, white inmates have made up the
majority of those under sentence of death. Of the 98 executions carried out in
the U.S. in 1999, 61 were white, 33 were black, 2 were Asian and 2 were
American Indian.
1o Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
VOL. 10
DEATH PENALTY
capital punishment as applied in Georgia" and other states, finding that
new state laws providing for capital punishment ensured that the
punishment was not imposed "wantonly and freakishly" and that a
sentence of death was "always circumscribed by . . . legislative
guidelines. 12 In addition, the Court held mandatory death sentences
unconstitutional. 3 These and other protections ensure that those facing
the death penalty will have the kinds of substantive and procedural
protections demanded by the U.S. Constitution and the international
treaties to which the U.S. is a party. Many supporters of capital
punishment claim that those so convicted are actually given too much
protection, to the detriment of the efficient functioning of the criminal
justice system. 14 Some have even lamented the American system of
"super due process." 15
M. No Prohibition Per Se Under International Law
Neither is the U.S. prohibited from using the death penalty under
international law. No ban on the death penalty as such exists under the
United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter), the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), or any other treaty to which the U.S. is a party.
While the ICCPR does not abolish the death penalty, it does provide for
certain procedural requirements and limits the types of offenders to
which the penalty may be applied by signing parties.16 The U.S. ratified
the ICCPR on September 8, 1992, with a reservation to Article 6 which
prohibits use of the death penalty on persons under the age of 18, subject
to its own constitutional restraints. 7 While the General Assembly has
adopted and proclaimed an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which looks
toward ultimate abolition of the death penalty,18 the United States has not
signed this Protocol. The American Convention on Human Rights
contains substantially greater limitations on use of death penalty, and,
therefore, the U.S. has not ratified that covenant, either. On the subject of
n See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
12 Id. at 207.13 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
14 See Peter Bronson, Death Penalty: Still Guilty, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June
18,2000.
15 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Eddie Lucio, Jr. (Tex.), Landmark bill adding
Life Without Parole as sentencing option in capital cases passes in Senate
Committee on Criminal Justice, (April 19, 2001) (on file with author).
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March 23, 1976, 999,
art. 6, U.N.T.S. 172.
17 See United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 653 (1992).
18 Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44
t1
Sess., No. 98 U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (1990).
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death penalty abolition, the U.S. seems to epitomize the persistent
objector.
As for the argument that abolition has become customary
international law, Professor Hood correctly observes that the case of
Kindler v. Canada1 9 (in which the Supreme Court of Canada allowed
extradition of a Canadian citizen to the U.S. without assurances that the
death penalty would not be imposed, which ruling was later held not to
violate the ICCPR by the United Nations Human Rights Committee)
"shows that there is still no international consensus on this issue."20 UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, an opponent of the death penalty, has
also publicly stated that the issue of the death penalty is one on which
UN member states are 'deeply divided."21 Obviously, deep division is
nothing like international consensus.
Human Rights, or Simply Justice?
Because the stakes are arguably as high for those convicted and
sentenced to death as for their victims, it is necessary to ask why many
abolitionists claim that capital punishment is barbaric, or savage, or even
cruel to the point of being a per se human rights violation.22 It is doubtful
that abolitionists are so fervently opposed to the death penalty because of
its mere unpleasantness. Most forms of punishment are unpleasant,
intentionally so, and most advocates for abolition do not wish to put an
end to the states' rights to impose other forms. Is the critical point of the
claim, then, the degradation inherent in the punishment? Perhaps, and
perhaps capital punishment is inherently degrading, but again, so is
prison life according to most accounts, and the convicted murderer, in a
very real sense, chose to subject him or herself to the punishment.
Conversely, one could argue that if the condemned has been degraded, it
is by his or her own actions, not the state's in exacting punishment for
them. On the other hand, philosophers including Immanuel Kant, John
Stuart Mill, and George Hegel have argued that a deserved execution
actually affirms and gives the rightfully condemned person a certain
dignity by affirming his "rationality and responsibilities for his
,,23
actions.
19 See Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991; 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993).
20 Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J.
TRANSNAT'LL. & POL'Y 517, 540 (1997).
21 Inter Press Service (Dec. 18, 2000).
at http:/ www.oneworld.org/ips2/dec0O/00_22_003.html.
22 See, e.g., Tom Hundley, Europe Seeks to Convert U.S. on Death Penalty
Executions, Erode Role as Moral Leader, Many Activists Say, CHI. TRIB., June
26, 2000.
23 Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, HARV. L. REV.
AsS'N, Sec. V para. 4 (1986) at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/procon/haagarticle.htm;see also
John Stuart Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment, given before
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Wait a minute...which civilization?
Nor has a plausible explanation been offered as to why the death
penalty is "uncivilized".24 Most civilizations have provided for capital
punishment, as do most of the world's major religions. While subject to
interpretation, most adherents accept that the death penalty is provided
for in the Islamic scriptures, 25 the Jewish Torah,26 and is recognized as a
legitimate function of the secular government in the Pauline writings of
the Christian faith.27 Those who say their countries have abolished the
death penalty because they are enlightened probably -though perhaps not
consciously- mean only that they believe their countries enlightened
because they are abolitionist. In the end, they merely make the
uninformative and uninteresting assertion that they feel somehow more
moral because their countries do not allow capital punishment.
As much as the imposition of punishment for any crime can be
justified, capital punishment is. It is not -in the U.S., at least- applied
arbitrarily or wantonly, and therefore does not belong in the category of
those actions, rightfully detested, which are universally acknowledged as
violative of human rights, such as genocide. It is imposed on only the
worst offenders (almost always for the aggravated murder of innocent
victims, and so against society's worst human rights violators), only after
the highest degree of due process has been afforded, and in a manner that
has been determined by the nation's highest court not to be cruel and
unusual.28 As mentioned, however, some hold the taking of life to be
unacceptable no matter what the reason or how imposed. 9 While this is,
for many, a compelling argument, it is not for that reason morally correct
or logically sound. The state-sanctioned and imposed killing of a
convicted murderer does not demonstrate the barbaric and bloodthirsty
impulses of the mob, but rather the orderly and impartial administration
of justice on society's most heinous criminal offenders. As such, capital
punishment is as unlikely to brutalize or desensitize a nation's citizenry
as any other form of collective self-defense. The state, after all, is
responsible for the safety and security of its citizens. Those who believe
that no crime can ever justify imposition of the death penalty because, as
Council of Europe director-general of legal affairs Guy De Vel contends,
Parliament (Apr. 21, 1868); See also John O'Sullivan, Death and Justice, CHI.
SUN-TiMES, May 8, 2001.24 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25 Koran 2:178-179.26 See, e.g., Exodus 21:12.27 See Romans 13:4-5.28 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 178.
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"taking life is wrong", 30 are merely stating a personal conviction. In the
words of Professor van den Haag, "Such a belief can be neither
corroborated nor refuted; it. is an article of faith.",31 If it was an article of
faith shared by all, or nearly all nations, as, for example, the inherent evil
of torture, it would be relevant to and maybe controlling of this inquiry.
However, it is clearly not a universally held belief among nations, as
evidenced by the fact that at least 87 countries retain and employ the
death penalty.32
Professor Hood asserts that the death penalty is used so rarely in
the U.S. that it's usefulness is limited to political symbolism, and
therefore has no "direct utility" as a deterrent to crime.33 One might
ponder, however, why Professor Hood would conclude that the reality
that the U.S. carries out the ultimate punishment with caution and
temperance necessarily precludes its utility in preventing future crimes,
or apparently, anything else. As discussed below, the claim is quite likely
impossible to prove. In any case, the death penalty certainly incapacitates
the murderer him or herself from committing future crimes.
The Condemned Inocent Argument
Others argue that the death penalty is an inherently dangerous
and inappropriate punishment, and therefore always a human rights
violation, because of the risk of executing innocent persons.34 The most
immediate problem in advancing this argument is, of course, providing
any proof that execution of innocent people in fact occurs. One study
frequently cited by opponents of the death penalty claims to show that at
least 23 innocent people have been executed in the United States since
the beginning of the 20th century.35 The study, however, has been
slammed by scholars and law enforcement officers as "severely flawed in
critical respects," and that its findings actually "confirm... the view that
the risk [of execution of innocent persons] is too small to be a significant
factor in the debate over the death penalty."
3 6
Too small to be a significant factor? Isn't any risk unacceptable
when the consequences are so dire and irrevocable? Not if the only
evidence of such a thing actually happening is itself unreliable, and the
30 Barry James, McVeigh Case Adds to European Objections to Executions,
INT'LHERALD TRIB., May 12, 2001.
31 See van den Haag, supra note 22, at See. V para. 2.
32 Amnesty International, List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries
(Updated March 29, 2001), at http:/ www.amnesty.org.
See Hood, supra note 19, at 524.34 See Bedan, supra note 28.
3S MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 272 (1992).
36 Professor Paul G. Cassell, Statements before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, para. 7 (July 23, 1993).
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alternative is the deaths of significantly more innocent people at the
hands of convicted murderers that are released or escape from prison.
The number that accomplish the latter feat may be quite small, but
Professor Cassell, in reporting his findings to the House Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights, stated that of the approximately
52,000 state prison inmates serving time for murder in 1984, an
estimated 810 had previously been convicted of murder and had,
subsequent to those convictions, killed 821 people.37
IV. European Perceptions of Capital Punishment, and the U.S.
Many abolitionists, including Professor Hood, assert that
Western Europe has done away with the death penalty because of a
"growing respect for human rights" as well as a "lack of evidence to
support" any deterrent effect on crime.3 ' The latter assertion is simply
unprovable. As columnist Don Feder sardonically notes, "How do they
know? Survey takers don't go around asking, "Were you ever deterred
from killing someone by the possibility that you might pay the ultimate
price?, 39 In other words, how could one scientifically prove who among
us has been deterred? And if capital punishment should cease because
the deterring effect on crime can't be satisfactorily demonstrated, how
can we justify most other forms of punishment?
As to the former assertion that Europe has done away with the
death penalty due to a growing respect for human rights, the argument
again makes the increasingly popular but nevertheless misguided
assumption that capital punishment is necessarily a human rights issue to
begin with. This viewpoint is again summed up in very popular-but-
banal abolitionist fashion by Mr. De Vel, who states that "It is quite clear
that we [the Council of Europe] consider the death penalty to be contrary
to human rights, since these include the right to life." 40 That is certainly
clear. What is not clear (at least to half the world) is that the "right to
life" means a right to life free from criminal consequences the Council of
Europe finds distasteful or undignified. A more representative expression
of the sentiments of most people, certainly inside and perhaps outside the
U.S., is that of Judge Kozinski who contends that, "Most of us continue
to believe that those who show utter contempt for human life by
37 Cassell, para. 35. A related and perhaps more disturbing statistic, reported by
Jeff Jacoby in his June 8, 2000 column for The Boston Globe, "The
Abolitionists' Cop-Out', comes from the U.S. Department of Justice, which
calculated that, in 1995, criminals released "under supervision" committed
13,200 murders and 200,000 other violent crimes.
38 See Hood, supra note 19 at 525.
39 Capital Punishment Foes Dead Wrong, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 10, 2001; See
also Speech of John Stuart Mill, supra note 22.
40 See Barry James, supra note 29.
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committing remorseless, premeditated murder justly forfeit the right to
their own life.' 4
A More (or less) Humane Alternative
But even if, for the sake of argument, one were to concede that
the death penalty is a human rights violation, isn't the abolitionist
alternative of life imprisonment more cruel than a relatively quick death?
If one can argue the latter is a human rights violation because it is a
cruel, unusual, inhuman, or degrading form of punishment, how much
easier to characterize the former as one of the worst kinds of torture:
locking a person up (as Mill put it, "immuring him in a living tomb")42
until he should die naturally or perhaps at the hands of another inmate,
and therefore even more a violation of basic human rights. It seems that
most death penalty opponents are reacting not to the actual suffering or
even dignity of the individual, but to their own perceptions and distaste
for the idea of the death penalty. Writer George Bernard Shaw opined
that, "Abolitionists, whenever a capital sentence is passed, write letters to
the papers and sign petitions begging for reprieve, yet if the sentence is
commuted to one of imprisonment for life forget all about it and leave
the guilty wretch to his fate. Their emotions are as thoughtless as those of
the savages who shriek for his execution and would crowd round the
gallows to witness it ..... 43
Rather, the death penalty as practiced by the United States is
rightly characterized as a criminal justice issue; and as between nations,
the question is in most cases one of international treaty obligations and
comity, not human rights violations. As such, it should properly be
examined and debated by United Nations member states according to the
principles of the Preamble to and Article 1 of the U.N. Charter, which
affinm the member nations' determination "to establish conditions under
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and
other sources of international law can be maintained,"" and "develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.' ' Abolitionists states
would also do well to consider the words of Article 2.1 which provide
that "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members.' 4
Give the People What We Want
4' IssuEs AND CONTROVERSIES: DEATH PENALTY (Facts On File World News
CD-ROM, issue date Dec. 29, 1995).
42 Mill, supra note 22.
43 George Bernard Shaw, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1948.
44 U.N. CHARTER Preamble, para 3.
45 U.N. CHARTER art. 1.2.
46U.N. CHARTER art. 2.1.
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Interestingly, it is not at all clear that European citizens are as
widely opposed to the death penalty as their countries' treaty (and in the
case of nations such as Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany,
constitutional) provisions would seem to indicate. In the United
Kingdom, for example, it is reported that support for the reinstatement of
capital punishment is at about 65% 47, very nearly that of the U.S. Quite
possibly, the widespread movement to abolition in Europe was fueled not
so much by public sentiment, but by the agendas of those nations'
political elites, which abandoned the practice in spite of the will of the
majority of its citizens.48 One might reasonably wonder how, in
democratic countries, leaders can ignore the wishes of their constituents
on such an important topic. According to one writer and editor -who
asserts that, far from being morally superior to America's political
culture, Europe's is simply less democratic- a number of causes can
explain the phenomenon. First, "cornerstone" states in the European
Union pressure newer members to adopt the "European norm" of
abolition.49 Second, and related to the first, the EU does not have a
governmental structure that approximates the United States' federal
system, and cannot therefore disregard the opinions of leaders in other
regions of the Union.50 Additionally, the EU's parliamentary government
is "more resistant to... single-issue politics on which the death penalty
thrives."5' Finally, in these government structures people vote for parties
rather than individuals, therefore, they have little or no say in the
decisions of party committees in choosing their candidates.5 2
V. A Few Words on Trends
Opponents of the death penalty argue that the "trend" in
international law generally is away from the death penalty and toward
abolition. 3 While this may be an accurate statement about present
tendencies in individual nations' criminal justice policies, it does not
follow that newly-abolitionist nations (or long-established ones, for that
matter) view or should view the death penalty as a human rights
violation. An important thing to remember about trends is that they are
47 See Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice (Europe's Death Penalty
Elitism), NEw REPUBLIC ONLINE, (Post date July 20, 2000) at http://
www.tnr.com/073100/marshall073100.html; See also Europe's View of the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, available at http:/I
-vww.nytimes.com/2001/05/13/opinion/13SUN1 .html.48 See O'Sullivan, supra note 22.49 See Marshall, supra note 46.501d.
51 id.
52 id.
53 See, e.g., Prinzo, supra note 4, at 876; Mary K. Martin, A One-Way Ticket
Back to the United States: The Collision of International Extradition Law and
the Death Penalty, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 243 (1999).
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not necessarily determinative of norms. By their nature they are subject
to change, and sometimes even whim. But it will be instructive to take a
look at some other aspects of this specific "trend."
It must be acknowledged that capital punishment has been banned in
times of peace throughout the 43 countries in the Council of Europe. 4 In some
nations, it is even constitutionally prohibited.55 However, for many European
countries, this is likely the response to long experiences with oppressive regimes,
which the U.S. as a nation simply has not had. 6 According to Ruprecht Polenz,
Muenster's representative on the foreign policy committee of the Bundestag in
the Federal Parliament in Berlin, "[Germany's] views have been shaped by the
experience of the Third Reich, when the potential for abuse was so horribly
apparent in the state's right to decide matters of life and death. 57
Abolition of the death penalty is a precondition of European
Union membership, s8 therefore, it is not surprising that retentionist
countries applying for EU membership would change their positions (or
become "enlightened") on the subject, in order to gain the economic and
other perceived benefits of EU membership. This does not, of course,
account for abolition in many other countries. But neither does focusing
only on the switch to abolition in these countries provide a very accurate
look at the larger picture. For instance, some countries that tried the
abolition experiment have reinstated the death penalty in recent years,
including the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Gambia.5 9 A number
of countries (11 by 1996) that were presumed to be abolitionist at least in
practice, have resumed executions.60 At least 87 countries throughout the
world maintain and use the death penalty, including the Bahamas,
Jamaica, Japan and Thailand.61 While a 1979 survey of penalties for drug
trafficking in 125 countries revealed that the death penalty could be
imposed in 10 of them, by 1995 the number rose to at least twenty-six.
62
As Professor Hood writes in his Article "The Death Penalty: The USA in
World Perspective", "[T]here has been a marked resistance to appeals for
abolition in the United States and various other parts of the world... 6
54 See James, supra note 29.
55 Constitution of The Federal Republic of Germany, Article 102 states: "The
death penalty is abolished." Title I, Article 27 of Italy's Constitution reads in
part: "The death penalty is not admitted except in cases specified by military
laws in time of war."56 See van den Haag, supra note 22.57 Carol J. Williams, Europeans Baffled by U.S. Support of Death Penalty, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000.
58 See Hundley, supra note 21.
59 See Hood, supra note 19, at 520.60 ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE, 49-52
(2d ed. 1996).
1 Amnesty International, supra note 31.
62 See Hood, supra note 59, at 60-62.
63 See Hood, supra note 19, at 524.
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(emphasis added) Even those in favor of the growing "trend" toward
abolition find it noteworthy that in most abolitionist countries, opinion
polls show that the majority of those nations' citizens would prefer to
have it than not.64 Perhaps of greater import, the number of abolitionist
countries that death penalty opponents put forward to prove the trend
looks rather doubtful upon examination. At the very least, it seems
disingenuous to label nations "abolitionist" that retain the death penalty
in law but haven't used it in the last ten years, or which provide for it
only in times of war or other emergency (a limitation on, but not
necessarily a condemnation of, the practice), as Amnesty International
does.65 So, while recognizing a trend toward abolition in some countries,
it is not at all certain that this trend is what death penalty opponents
claim, or that it will continue, or even that it is reflective of the will of
most nations' citizens.
Finally, even if nothing above casts doubt on the ultimate
outcome of the trend toward abolition, in any event the U.S. Supreme
Court has made it clear that it will not be guided by trends that do not yet
embody customary international law, at least in deciding questions of 80h
Amendment jurisprudence.66
Everyone Wants Assurances
The more specific problem, from the perspective of U.S.-
European extradition duties, is the refusal of some European nations to
send or return fugitives to the United States in potentially capital cases,
even when these countries have agreed by treaty to extradite in such
situations. These refusals have been justified and even celebrated by
European and American abolitionists as the "subordinat[ion of]
extradition law to human rights norms. 67 Ennobling as that sounds to the
abolitionist ear, the statement turns out to be nothing more than a
euphemism for the increasing tendency of continental courts to
circumvent treaty obligations in the name of Europe's rather pietistic and
parochial conception of human rights. It is not an accurate statement
about customary international extradition law.
A few clarifications with respect to this problem should be made.
First, the refusal by a nation to extradite in capital murder cases is not -in
the absence of a treaty duty to do so- improper under international law,
and certainly not where a treaty between the party States so provides.
Nor is there any difficulty where treaty parties stipulate that extradition
in such cases will only be granted when sufficient assurances from the
requesting state that the death penalty will not be sought are secured by
64 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAwKINs, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA at 12 (1986).65 Amnesty International, supra note 31.
66 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, n.1 at 370.
67 Mark E. DeWitt, Comment, Extradition Enigma: Italy and Human Rights vs.
America and the Death Penalty, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 535, 542 (1998).
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the requested State.68 These are prerogatives that sovereign nations enjoy
when negotiating whether and in what circumstances they will honor a
request to extradite. However, a troubling trend of another sort is
developing in Europe, where the European Court of Human Rights
seems intent on limiting more and more the sovereignty of member states
in determining their own treaty obligations, as well as deciding when the
Court's "totality of the circumstances" interpretation of human rights
violations would supercede them, as it did in the case of accused (and
later convicted) double-murderer Jens Soering. Mr. Soering, a German
national, was wanted in Virginia for the murders of his girlfriend's
parents, and a request for extradition was made of England, where he had
been arrested for check fraud.69 While the Court recognized the
"undoubted" legitimacy of the reason for Soering's extradition to the
U.S., "in accordance with the Extradition Treaty between the United
Kingdom and the United States,"70 it nevertheless found that the U.K.
would be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights
without "greater assurances" that Soering would not face the death
penalty, or the "inhuman or degrading" (per Article 3 of the European
Convention) conditions of the "death row phenomenon., 71
This fairly transparent attempt to coerce the U.S. to a) recognize
the death penalty as an inherent human rights issue, and b) to abolish its
practice, has been noted and commented upon especially by those most
enthusiastic about the Court's holding. One commentator writes that the
Court seems to be "leaning towards not allowing the extradition of
prisoners from Convention States to States where the death penalty still
exists, ' 72 while another notes that "implicit in [the Court's] holding that
Soering's extradition by Great Britain would 'violate Article 3 is the
finding that the conditions surrounding the use of the death penalty by
the United States run against that article and, indeed, the customary
international law of human rights."73
In reality, use of the death penalty by the United States does not,
by itself, violate customary international law, nor any human rights treaty
to which the U.S. is a party. As Professor Nanda writes:
The trend toward abolition of the death penalty notwithstanding, there is
not sufficient state practice and opinio juris for the abolition of the death
penalty that has developed as customary international law. Thus, a
68 See, e.g., Article 12 of the U.S.-Germany Treaty Concerning Extradition, 32
U.S.T. 1485 (Aug. 29, 1980 Date-In-Force).69 See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1989).
'old. at para. 110.
7 1Id. atpara. 111.
72 Robertson, Extradition, Inhuman Treatment and the Death Penalty, 154 JUST.
PEACE 231, 231 (1990).
73 Richard B. Lillich, Notes and Comments: The Soering Case, 85 AM. J.INT'L.
L. 128, 147 (1991).
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general proposition prohibiting extradition to a country still retaining
capital punishment cannot be maintained.74
The "death row phenomenon" likewise is not anywhere near a
settled matter in international human rights jurisprudence, and is also a
risky proposition for abolitionists, as it will almost certainly be taken by
U.S. supporters of capital punishment as further evidence of the ill
effects of the "super due process" afforded death row inmates. Nor does
the European Court's somewhat scattered holding serve by itself to
elevate abolition to the level of customary international law. What the
holding actually does is further subject EU member states to the Court's
tentative and confusing extradition jurisprudence, and perhaps engender
greater dissatisfaction with its competence and even jurisdiction. This
attempt to substitute the Court's norms for international ones could
backfire. The German Federal Constitutional Court has itself recognized
the conflicts with state sovereignty inherent in the European Union, and
has complained of the "ambiguous nature of the EU legal system.
75
While this is, in a sense, a risk that the states of the European Union
"contracted" into, the Court should be careful not to view it as an
opportunity to attempt to mold U.S. domestic policy, or to interfere with
any European nation's treaty obligations.
More troubling, though, is the ruling of the Italian Constitutional
Court in In Re Venezia, in which the U.S. had sought the return to Dade
County, Florida of Pietro Venezia, who in 1994 confessed to murdering a
Florida state government collection agent in front of the agent's home.7 6
After being arrested in Italy, the U.S. requested his extradition under its
treaty with Italy.77 The Court ultimately refused extradition, essentially
holding that its Constitution's prohibitions against the death penalty and
guarantee of the "right to life" were superior to any treaty agreements.
78
The U.S.-Italian treaty provided that:
[W]hen the offense for which extradition is requested is
punishable by death under laws of the requesting Party,
extradition shall be refused, unless the requesting Party
provides such assurances as the requested Party considers
74 Ved P. Nanda, Essay, Bases for Refusing International Extradition
Requests-Capital Punishment and Torture, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1369, 1379
(2000).
75 Sean C. Monaghan, European Union Legal Personality Disorder: The
Union's Legal Nature Through the Prism of the German Federal Constitutional
Court's Maastricht Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1443, 1445 (1998).
76 DeWitt, supra note 66, at 567; see also Arnold Markowitz, Pasta to Die
For?, MIAMI HERALD, May 29, 1994.
77 Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, TIAS No. 10,837, 24 ILM 1525
(1985) (entered into force Sept. 24, 1984) [hereinafter U.S.-Italy Extradition
Treaty].
78In Re Venezia, pt. I, para 2.2 (June 25, 1996); See also DeWitt, supra note 66,
at 569-573.
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sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if
imposed, shall not be executed. 79
Although the U.S. Department of Justice followed an oral assurance not
to seek the death penalty with a written promise, the Court questioned
the assurance because Venezia would be tried in a state court. The Court
seemed to resolve that issue for itself, though, writing that it was
confident the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause would require
Florida to abide by the federal government's promise to Italy.8° In the
end, the Italian Court decided that there was, essentially, no such thing as
a sufficient assurance in light of Italy's absolute constitutional
protections against the death penalty and of the "right to life". One
commentator suggested that the Court's reasoning was based on Italian
sentiment against the death penalty and a desire to show the U.S. that it
did not support its practice.81 If true, that is, if the Italian Court's
purportedly constitutional holding was merely a pretense, and its true
purpose was to engender anti-death penalty sentiment in order to coerce
the U.S. into abandoning the practice of capital punishment, then one
should not hesitate to view Italy's conduct as not only an inexcusable
violation of its treaty duties to the U.S., but also interference in U.S.
internal affairs. Recognizing that utilization of the death penalty is not a
violation of The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (as even most
abolitionists do), that there is not international consensus that waiting on
"death row" necessarily amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment,
and that capital punishment is not in itself a violation of customary
international law, such an action is inherently violative of the principle of
state sovereignty, and abolitionist nations would do well to consider the
ramifications of attempting to force even their most laudable beliefs on
states that have arrived at different conclusions on as-yet unresolved
international issues.
Currently, four years after the U.S. first requested extradition
from France of fugitive Ira Einhorn for the moreder of his former
girlfriend, the French government has still not made a final decision to
extradite.82 Additionally, a new episode of political maneuvering has
begun with the United States' recent request of that country to extradite
accused abortion-doctor killer James Kopp.83 Seemingly emboldened (or
79 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty art. IX.
so See DeWitt, supra note 66, at 574-575.
8 1 Id. at 569.
82 See A Step Ahead of the Law, U.S. NEWs, Aug. 7, 2000, available at http://
www.usnews.com.
83 See Beverly Lumpkin, Copping Kopp, ABC NEWS, available at
http://wvw.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/HalsOfJustice/halsofustice74.html#A
Editor's Note: Both Ira Einhorn and James Kopp have been extradited to the
U.S. from France with the assurance that the death penalty will not be sought.
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perhaps just pressured) by.the European Court's holding in Soering, it
appears that more countries are willing to ignore their extradition treaties
with the U.S., or at least give them less than the consideration they
warrant. While neither French law nor its Constitution (nor, for that
matter, its current extradition treaty with the U.S.) require France to
refuse extradition even in death penalty cases84 and even though
Einhorn's first trial in absentia in Pennsylvania resulted in a conviction
and a sentence of life imprisonment, France will likely give in to
pressure from the EU and the European Court of Human Rights and not
extradite either Einhorn or Kopp without a promise by the U.S. not to
seek the death penalty-though its treaty with the U.S. does not require
such assurances-simply because both Pennsylvania state law (in
Einhom's case) and New York's (in Kopp's) provide for the death
penalty. While progress seems to have been made in the Einhom case
during the past months, he is presently living free in France while his
appeal is pending review by France's highest legal administrative body,
the Council of State. s6
Recent events at the United Nations further suggest a European
ploy to pressure the U.S. into the abolitionist fold. On April 25, U.S.
Ambassador George E. Moose voted on behalf of the United States
against resolution E/CN.4/2001/L.93 as drafted, which called on all
States parties to the ICCPR to accede to or ratify the Second Protocol to
the International Covenant, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.
8 7
A week later, the U.S. lost its seat on the Human Rights Commission for
the first time since its formation. It is not difficult or even unreasonable
to view this unprecedented action as part of a scheme by some European
nations to coerce the U.S. to abandon its use of the death penalty.
Initially offering reasons such as the U.S. arrearage in U.N. dues and its
opposition to the creation of an International Criminal Court as possible
explanations for the vote, 8 many nations and commentators are
beginning to consider and suggest the far more likely explanation that the
EU and some other countries wanted to punish the United States for its
stand on capital punishment.89 Joanna Weschler, the U.N. Human Rights
84 See U.S.-France Treaty on Extradition, T.I.A.S. No. 7075, 22 U.S.T. 407.
85 See Lumpkin, supra note 82.
86Julie Stoiber, French Leader Decides Not to Reconsider Extraditing Einhorn,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 7,2000.
87 Press Release, United Nations, Commission on Human Rights Adopts Ten
Resolutions, Measures on the Death Penalty, Impunity, and Other Issues
Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Apr. 25, 2001).
88 BBC News Online (May 3, 2001) at
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid%5F1311000/131
1468.stm.
89 See N.Y TIMES, Europe's View of the Death Penalty, May 13, 2001
(Editorial).
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Watch representative, commented immediately after the vote that the
U.S. had voted "on the wrong side of several human rights issues."90
VI. Conclusion
What should be remembered perhaps above all is the
indisputable fact that, when promised, the U.S. has never failed to honor
its word to either not seek the death penalty or to not impose it. Quite
likely, even if a prosecutor attempted to avoid honoring such an
assurance, he or she would be compelled to do so by American courts in
much the same way our courts enforce plea agreements against our own
state and federal governments. The Italian Constitutional Court's
seeming distrust of U.S. assurances is therefore unwarranted and its
constitutional claim unjustifiable, in light of Italy's extradition treaty
with the U.S. Some suggest that, due to trends in the development of
European human rights jurisprudence, the U.S. will more frequently find
itself either unable to secure extradition, having to resort to alternative
methods of bringing fugitives back to its soil, such as forcible
abduction,91 agreeing to sentence extraditees according to punishments
employed for the same crime by the requested state,92 or else finally
joining the ranks of the abolitionist nations. All this assumes that the
U.S. is to blame for the position it finds itself in, apparently because it
continues to practice a method of punishment that is lawful under its own
domestic as well as international law.
The reality is that European and other states that would refuse to
extradite to the United States, in spite of U.S. assurances not to execute,
and contrary to their voluntarily assumed treaty obligations, are the true
offenders. There are solutions to the dilemma other than for the U.S. to
become international kidnapers or to give in to the ersatz humani-
tarianism of some self-proclaimed enlightened nations. The onus,
however, lies with those states that would dishonor their treaty
commitments for the sake of expediting other political ends to rethink the
matter, and consider these other solutions. They may amend their
constitutions (not always as difficult a proposition in civil law countries
as in the U.S.), or renounce their extradition treaties with the U.S. and-
hopefully-negotiate new ones. Whatever they decide, they should be
sensitive to the values of and prudential in their behavior towards close
allies, and steadfastly mindful of the value of their reputations in the
international community.
90 BBC News Online, supra note 87.
9' See Mary K. Martin, A One-Way Ticket Back to the United States: The
Collision of International Extradition Law and the Death Penalty, 11 CAP. DEF.
J. 243,259-260.92Id. at 261.
VOL. 10
